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Abstract Climate change research with the economic
methodology of cost–benefit analysis is challenging
because of valuation and ethical issues associated with
the long delays between CO2 emissions and much of their
potential damages, typically of several centuries. The large
uncertainties with which climate change impacts are
known today and the possibly temporary nature of some
envisaged CO2 abatement options exacerbate this chal-
lenge. For example, potential leakage of CO2 from
geological reservoirs, after this greenhouse gas has been
stored artificially underground for climate control reasons,
requires an analysis in which the uncertain climatic
consequences of leakage are valued over many centuries.
We here present a discussion of some of the relevant
questions in this context and provide calculations with the
top–down energy-environment-economy model DEMETER.
Given the long-term features of the climate change
conundrum as well as of technologies that can contribute
to its solution, we considered it necessary extending
DEMETER to cover a period from today until the
year 3000, a time span so far hardly investigated with
integrated assessment models of climate change.
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1 Introduction
Though much is left to be understood about the technical,
economic, political, and public acceptance dimensions of
CO2 capture and storage (CCS), it may become a major
mechanism to curb global CO2 emissions. According to the
Special Report on CCS (SR-CCS) of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), it is expected that CO2
artificially injected underground can remain securely stored
during at least centuries [13]. Even while the probability of
long-term CO2 storage integrity is deemed very high, it
cannot be excluded that, e.g. because of unforeseen effects,
CO2 may once leak from geological reservoirs to the
atmosphere. In that case, CCS would constitute a delay of
CO2 emissions rather than a genuine reduction option (see
e.g. [35, 37]). This problem is serious, as the use of CCS
itself requires energy—applied to standard electricity
generation, for example, it involves a substantial part of
the energy content of the fossil fuels used. In other words,
more fossil fuels are required to run a fossil-based power
plant equipped with CCS in order to produce the same net
output of electricity as a conventional non-CCS plant.
Hence, with CCS application, more CO2 is captured and
stored underground than the amount of avoided emissions.
The climatic consequences of slow CCS-associated CO2
leakage may thus be grave, as are possibly the economic
implications.
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Studying the long term through the discipline of
economics is challenging. The question addressed in this
paper is therefore: if stored CO2 would gradually leak over
a time frame of 100 to 1,000 years, how would we need to
evaluate this leakage in an economic framework? In an
earlier publication, we analyzed the economics of CCS with
a focus on non-trivial seepage patterns, by contrasting an
exponential with a hump-shaped leakage model over a
relatively short time frame of about 100 years [34]. In the
present article, we analyze more in depth the underlying
methodology and discuss the issues that arise with cost–
benefit analysis of CCS characterized by CO2 leakage in a
setting that considers both the very long term and aspects of
uncertainty. In this section, we first make a number of
preliminary observations, whereas in Section 2, we describe
the model we used for our analysis and the way in which
we adapted it for this paper’s purposes. In Section 3, we
report our main findings in terms of a series of model run
outcomes, while in Section 4, we summarize our main
conclusions.
The presence of oil, natural gas, and CO2 trapped in
geological formations demonstrates that reservoir seals
exist that are able to contain fossil fuels and CO2
underground over time scales of millions of years. Still, it
is not unimaginable that CO2 artificially stored under-
ground slowly leaks from its geological medium and
gradually migrates to the aboveground environment. Espe-
cially for storage options other than depleted oil and gas
fields, such as aquifers and coal seams, aspects of long-term
storage effectiveness remain for the moment uncertain. A
large number of sites exist where one expected to find oil or
natural gas, but where no such resources proved available,
potentially as a result of an insufficient quality of geological
cap-rock material. At many places on Earth, large quantities
of oil and natural gas may once have been stored
underground, but that, in the absence of appropriate
containment layers, eventually seeped away to be absorbed
in the aboveground biosphere or atmosphere [2]. Hence, it
may not be guaranteed that the formations employed for
artificial CO2 storage retain integrity forever, possibly for
depleted oil and natural gas fields, but especially for other
types of geological reservoirs (see e.g. also [16]). Plenty of
natural examples exist, as well as instances related to
human activity including exploration, mining, production,
and storage of natural resources, which involved either low-
speed modest seepage or sudden large-scale leakage of
liquid or gaseous substances [17–19].1
Indicative figures for possible CO2 leakage from the SR-
CCS of the IPCC [13] suggest that for carefully selected
CO2 storage sites annual leakage rates are very likely to
remain below 0.1%/year. It could prove difficult, however,
to select CO2 storage sites for which one can guarantee
such low leakage rates, let alone a 100% storage efficiency,
e.g. due to the high heterogeneity between different types of
geological storage formations. Also, if more stringent
limitations appear to exist than expected with respect to
CO2 storage site selection capabilities, or management
proves more intricate or insufficient during storage opera-
tion, leakage rates of 0.1%/year or even 1%/year may not
be totally excludable. It has been argued that 1%/year CO2
leakage is unacceptable from a global climate point of view,
while a 0.1%/year leakage rate may perhaps be permissible
(see e.g. [35] and references therein). At a 1%/year CO2
leakage rate a given quantity of geologically stored CO2
will have reduced to 37% of that amount after 100 years,
whereas 90% of that quantity is still stored underground
after a century for a storage medium characterized by a
0.1%/year leakage rate. Given that climate change is a
problem stretching over at least the forthcoming centuries,
one concludes that in the 1%/year leakage case CCS
clearly becomes an ineffective emissions abatement
option. If a 0.1%/year leakage rate applies; however, a
large share of the geologically stored CO2 remains
sequestered even after the time frame of a couple of
centuries, so that CCS retains much of its value as climate
management technology. This simple observation is con-
firmed by more refined economic analyses of climate change
and CCS with CO2 leakage (see [10, 29]).
In our previous paper [34], we made a concise analytical
inspection of the economic problem of CO2 leakage as
associated with CCS deployment, as well as a more detailed
integrated assessment analysis of this issue with the top–
down model DEMETER. In particular, we derived an
expression for the CCS effectiveness ηt:
ht ¼ 1
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¼ 1
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0 e
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The first part of Eq. 1 defines the CCS effectiveness as
the share ηt of the carbon emission price τt that CCS
operators receive for storing CO2. In other words, we define
the CCS effectiveness as the marginal social value of CO2
storage, relative to the case in which the integrity of storage
is perfect. The marginal value of CO2 storage is reduced by
the shadow price μt for stored CO2, and the effectiveness
measure relates this to the current shadow price of
emissions τt. The second equality expresses the shadow
price μt as the net present value of the future social costs
associated with the future stream of leaking CO2, corrected
for the energy penalty, since a share 1−c of the energy
content of the primary fuel is required to operate the CCS
process. Hence, in order to avoid one unit of CO2 through
1 The recent Gulf of Mexico oil spill showed, for example, that neither
oil production activities nor manmade closures of oil fields are
infallible.
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CCS implementation, one needs to capture and store 1/c
units of CO2 (0<c<1). The third equality assumes a
constant leakage rate λ, so that an amount equal to
l c=ð Þels will leak back to the atmosphere at every
future point in time. Furthermore, the second equality
assumes that carbon taxes increase exponentially at rate g,
so that τt+s=e
gsτt, and a constant interest rate r. The third
equality can easily be obtained through basic mathematics.
This equation helps to understand how the CCS effectiveness
depends on the energy penalty (−), the leakage rate (−), the
carbon price growth path (−), and the interest rate (+).Values
for the effectiveness of CCS obtained by applying Eq. 1,
however, do not necessarily directly translate into outcomes
of our numerical simulations. We explain this in more detail
in Section 2.
For our present work, we updated the model DEMETER
and extended it to cover a much longer time horizon in
order to connect to new insights in particularly the
geoscientific arena (see also [27]). With regard to the main
economics features of DEMETER, we introduced an
extension until the year 2300, while for the model’s
subroutines representing a reduced-form climate system,
respectively, a CO2-leaking geological reservoir, we
implemented an horizon that stretches as far as our
modeling end-point in the year 3000. To our knowledge,
it is the first time that a top–down energy-economy-
environment model has been developed that covers such a
long time frame—which we consider essential for study-
ing this subject matter appropriately.2 The length of this
time span is, in addition to the modeling of uncertainty
with respect to CO2 seepage phenomena, the main novelty
that we proffer to the environmental modeling, assessment,
and economics literature.
2 Model and Methodology
DEMETER simulates the global use of fossil fuels, non-
fossil energy, and an energy technology that decarbonizes
fossil fuels through the application of CCS [8]. This model,
including a basic climate module and generic production
and consumption behavior, is an extension of DEMETER
that previously has been instrumental in the study of several
other climate-related policy questions (see [5–8, 32]).
Recently, DEMETERwas also extended and used specifically
for the purpose of studying CCS-related issues [34].
DEMETER describes a representative agent who
maximizes the net present value of utility under a set
of equilibrium conditions and a range of (inter alia
climate-related) constraints. Solving the program involves the
quantification of a combination of policy instruments and the
calculation of dynamic time paths for a series of
economic and energy-specific variables that together lead
to an optimal aggregated and discounted overall welfare.
The simulated climate change dynamics are as in the
seminal DICE model, characterized by a multi-layered
system that consists of an atmosphere, an upper-ocean
and a lower-ocean stratum (see for the details [24]).
Since DEMETER has been used in several papers already,
that include extensive accounts of the adopted simulation
characteristics, we restrict ourselves here to a concise
presentation of its main features, mostly as related to CCS.
We refer in particular to Gerlagh et al. [7] for a broad
general description of the model and to Gerlagh and van
der Zwaan [8] for more details on the specifications with
regard to CCS.
To summarize briefly, there are four representative
producers and corresponding sectors, denoted by super-
scripts j=C, F, N, and CCS, for the producer of the final
good, the producer of energy based on fossil-fuel technology,
respectively, carbon-free technology, and the producer of
CCS technology. Output of the final good sector is
denoted by YC. This good is used for consumption C,
investments I in all four sectors, operation and mainte-
nance M in both energy sectors and the application of CCS
technology to the fossil-fuel energy sector (see Eq. 2). Our
distinction between investment costs and operation and
maintenance costs is in line with the simulation of these
two distinct cost components in most bottom–up energy
systems models. For the latter, see e.g. Keppo and van der
Zwaan [15], who present an analysis regarding CCS
deployment under uncertain CO2 storage capacity with
the energy systems model TIAM-ECN.
Ct þ ICt þ IFt þ ICCSt þ INt þMFt þMCCSt þMNt ¼ YCt : ð2Þ
In order to describe production, DEMETER accounts for
technology embodied in capital that is installed in all
previous periods. It distinguishes between production that
uses the vintages of previous (minus the most recent)
periods on the one hand, and production that uses the
newest vintage for which the capital stock has been
installed in the directly preceding period on the other hand.
The input and output variables (as well as prices) associated
with the most recent vintage are denoted by tildes (~).
Vintages are scrapped at rate δ¸ so that current activity
levels are for a fraction (1−δ) determined by previous activity,
and for the complementary part (δ) by new activity; see also
the dynamics described by Eqs. 6–7 below. In this way,
DEMETER captures economic inertia that are important for
designing and evaluating optimal climate policy (see [9]).
2 The analysis by Hasselmann et al. [11] also involves a very long
time frame but uses reduced-form abatement costs without specifica-
tion of the mechanisms of energy savings, non-carbon energy use and
CCS deployment.
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For every vintage, the production of the final good is
based on a nested CES-function, using a capital–labor
composite,
~
Zt, and a composite measure for energy
services,
~
Et, as intermediates:
~
YCt ¼ A1t
~
Zt
  g1ð Þ g= þ A2t ~Et
  g1ð Þ g= g g1ð Þ=
; ð3Þ
in which A1t and A
2
t are technology coefficients, and γ is the
substitution elasticity between
~
Zt and
~
Et. The capital–labor
composite
~
Zt is defined as:
~
Zt ¼ ICt1
 a ~
Lt
 1a
; ð4Þ
which expresses that the capital–labor composite has a
fixed value share α for capital. New capital is by definition
equal to investments made one period ahead:
~
Kjt ¼ I jt1.
We model energy production
~
Et through a CES-
aggregate of the two energy types, generated respectively
by the sectors F and N:
~
Et ¼ ~YFt
  s1ð Þ s= þ ~YNt
  s1ð Þ s= s s1ð Þ=
; ð5Þ
in which σ is the elasticity of substitution between F and N.
Energy services derived from fossil fuels can be
confronted with a carbon tax levied on CO2 emissions,
to which energy producers can respond by choosing to
decarbonize energy supply through CCS implementation.
Energy-related CO2 emissions, EnEmt, are proportional to
the carbon content of fossil fuels, denoted by "Ft . Part of
energy-related CO2 emissions, CCSR, is captured through
CCS technology (6). Equation 7 calculates the total flow
of CO2 capture and storage activity, CCSt, for both old
and new CCS technology vintages. For every ton of CO2
captured and not emitted, the amount of CO2 stored
exceeds the amount of CO2 captured by a factor 1/c
CCS,
due to the decrease in energy efficiency by a factor cCCS
as a result of CCS application. We calculate CO2 leakage
trough a two-box system (as in [34]), since it is the
simplest way to simulate the likely phenomenon that
there will be close to zero leakage directly after
injection, but that leakage occurs with an increasing
rate after some specified time (typically gaining
momentum decades after closure of the storage site)
and that ultimately this rate gradually declines back to
zero as a result of natural trapping mechanisms. In
every period the stock of stored CO2, SCCSt , consists of
two compartments: S1CCSt and S2
CCS
t . The first compart-
ment increases with the flow of CCSt, while a fixed share
dCCS1 of the stored stock of CO2 leaks into the second box
(8). The second box leaks to the atmosphere (9)—this
secondary seepage adds to future emissions of anthropo-
genic CO2 (10). For the present paper, we use this leakage
module with an expected average delay between storage
and leakage of 100 years (high leakage) and 500 years
(low leakage), respectively.
EnEmt ¼ 1 dð ÞEnEmt1 þ "Ft 1 CCSRtð Þ
~
YFt ; ð6Þ
CCSt ¼ 1 dð ÞCCSt1 þ CCSRt"Ft
~
Y Ft c
CCS

; ð7Þ
S1CCStþ1 ¼ 1 dS1ð ÞS1CCSt þ CCSt; ð8Þ
S2CCStþ1 ¼ 1 dS2ð ÞS2CCSt þ dS1S1CCSt ; ð9Þ
ATMtþ1 ¼ EnEmt þ Emt
 þdCCS2 S2ccst
 
þ TRatmatmATMt þ TRatmul ULt:
ð10Þ
The public agent sets not only taxes to CO2 emissions
but also decides on the exemption that fossil fuel users
receive from paying the CO2 tax after they have comple-
mented their fossil energy consumption with CCS. When
this central agent imposes a CO2 tax, one of the possible
reactions of the entire economy is a decrease in overall
energy consumption. Producers can also shift from fossil
fuels to carbon-free energy, or, alternatively, decarbonize
fossil-based energy production through the application of
CCS. The level of CO2 emissions is proportional to the
consumption of fossil fuels not complemented with CCS.
Like in van der Zwaan and Gerlagh [33], CO2 emissions
from current fossil fuel use are complemented by additional
emissions generated from geological leakage of previously
stored CO2. Unlike in van der Zwaan and Gerlagh [33],
however, where we assumed a constant leakage rate, we
here adopt a two-layer storage model as specified above
(and in [34]). Since the leakage rate is non-constant and
carbon taxes do not increase at a constant rate, Eq. 1 for the
effectiveness of CCS does not carry over immediately. Yet,
the carbon tax and CCS exemption from this tax can, ex-post,
be treated as proxies for the shadow price of CO2 and CCS
effectiveness. In comparison to van der Zwaan and Gerlagh
[34], for the purposes of this paper, we have made a series of
modifications in order to account for the possibly very
long-term effects of CO2 leakage associated with CCS.
The first modification concerns the time window over
which we perform our analysis. To fully account for CO2
leakage, we extended the seepage subroutine and climate
module to the year 3000. Prolonging the economic part of
DEMETER equally far into the future we deem unnecessary,
so that we chose to calculate the full economic equilibrium
with increasing population and productivity for the years
2010–2200 (the first simulation period) only. For the next
100 years, from 2200 to 2300 (the second simulation period),
we assume constant population and productivity and
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calculate efficient investment levels omitting the equilibrium
conditions that link CO2 taxes to the use of fossil fuels, non-
fossil fuels, energy savings, and CCS deployment. The main
difference between the first and second period is that the
latter abstracts from learning externalities. In the third (i.e.
final) period, from 2300 to 3000, we only employ the climate
module. An important feature, however, is that temperature
changes in the last period are converted into a measure of
damages included in the overall welfare function which thus
affect the optimization program in the first period.
We assume that there is one representative agent, who
chooses optimal taxes and partial carbon tax exemption for
CCS-complemented fossil fuels in the first period, and all
abatement options in the second period, to maximize public
welfare:
W ¼
XT1
t¼1
1þ rð Þ1tLt ln Ct Lt=ð Þ 
XT2
t¼1
1þ rð Þ1tLtDt;
ð11Þ
in which W is total welfare, ρ the pure rate of time
preference, Ct/Lt consumption per capita, and Dt the
induced climate change damage in units of utility. In other
words, the latter constitutes a damage that does not affect
the overall production level. This welfare structure can be
understood as an assumption that climate damages grow
proportionally with income, even when they cannot be
expressed in losses of economic output.3 To see this, notice
that when Dt=0.01, welfare decreases with the same level,
0.01(1+ρ)1–tLt, as if consumption Ct decreased by 1%. We
use 2% and 20% of GDP (or, more precisely, GWP, i.e.
gross world product) as the low and high estimates,
respectively, for the damages resulting from global climate
change, both as associated with a 3°C average temperature
increase. The economic horizon, T1 (2,300), is shorter than the
geo-scientific (that is, climate change) horizon, T2 (3,000).
Our second major modification in comparison to
previous versions of DEMETER is that we separate the
welfare perspective of the representative public agent from
the savings decision of the representative private consumer.
In other words, we do not assume a constant pure time
preference parameter that governs the savings decisions of
the representative consumer, nor do we employ such a
parameter that is subsequently simultaneously used for
intergenerational welfare aggregation (as we did in previous
versions of DEMETER). Instead, we suppose that consumers
save a constant fraction of output, s, and that savings are
efficiently distributed between the various investment
opportunities. Savings determine the real interest rate,
captured in the model through the variable βt that defines
the corresponding price of the consumer good in period t+1,
relative to the price in period t, through the relation βt=1/
(1+ it). In this equation, it is the real interest rate and 1+ it
are the costs of new capital in the next period, again
relative to the price of the consumer good.
This adjustment implies that we decouple investments in
capital from the social rate of time preference used for
optimal climate policy calculations. Rather than assuming
that capital markets reflect social preferences for spreading
consumption over time, we adopt a constant savings rate of
25%. The central planner who maximizes aggregated welfare
is assumed not to be able to change this savings behavior:
savings decisions are made by individuals as part of their life
cycle consumption decisions, rather than as part of an
intergenerational tradeoff for which a public agent is needed.4
Our assumption of an exogenous savings rate implies
that a gap may exist between the rate of return on capital
and the rate of return on public investments in climate
policy.5 The existence of such a gap, as modeled in our new
version of DEMETER, is not necessarily unreasonable.
Citizens may develop different time preferences during
their life, which affects their savings behavior. On a larger
time scale, this compares to varying intergenerational time
preferences, which influences public decisions on climate
change. Governments cannot commit future governments to
transfer public savings to future generations; thus, even if a
strict Pareto improvement were possible by decreasing
abatement and increasing savings, it might not be feasible
for a government to implement such a strategy [20].
DEMETER can thus be interpreted as using a utilitarian
framework,6 with a logarithmic utility function, and a 1%/
year or 3%/year pure rate of time preference for aggregation
over time, denoted as low or high discounting, respectively.
The third major adaptation of DEMETER with respect to
previous model versions concerns the inclusion of uncertainty
that resolves over time. Uncertainty is modeled through the
simulation of multiple possible states-of-the-world, each with
pre-specified probabilities, but with control variables (such as
prices and taxes) that are equal over the various states up to
period T*. At T*, uncertainty is resolved. After T*, the model
solves all equations in parallel for all states-of-the-world, but
with different values for policy variables for each of them.
For our purposes, crucial policy variables include the carbon
tax, needed to materialize set climate control goals. Before
T*, the model solves all equations but with the additional
requirement that all policy variables are the same over all
3 See Gerlagh and van der Zwaan [4] for a discussion on the modeling
of intangible climate change damages.
4 Note that in an Overlapping Generations (OLG) model savings also
do not depend on an intergenerational weighing of welfare, cf.
Gerlagh and van der Zwaan [4].
5 For an extensive theory discussion on public time preferences and
rates of returns on public investments, see Gerlagh and Liski [3].
6 See Schneider et al. [26] for a discussion on representative agents
versus the utilitarian framework.
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states-of-the-world. The two main periods (i.e., the time frames
before respectively after T*) are linked to each other in a way
common to this type of uncertainty modeling, that is, via
expected values of policy variables that together specify the
optimal policy during the first period. Running DEMETER
and solving the model’s optimization algorithm now yields
hedging strategies that take stock of all possible state-of-the-
world outcomes after the resolution of uncertainty at time T*.
A final group of smaller modifications concerns a
collection of several relatively minor adjustments of the
model. These relate to mostly calibration parameter value
assumptions, which can have a significant effect on the
modeling outcomes. We list here the most important of our
new parameter choices:
1. We re-calibrated our demographic assumptions through a
fit of recent medium-rangeUN scenario data with a logistic
curve plus a constant, in which the global population
converges to a maximum of 10.25 billion in 2100 [31].
2. We adjusted the climate-forcing target corresponding to
a doubling of the CO2 concentration from 4.1 down to
3.7 W/m2, while maintaining our central assumption of
a 3°C climate sensitivity.
3. We converted the currency with which we run our
model from US dollars to Euros, at 2000 price levels, in
order to emphasize the attention CO2 leakage currently
receives from the research community in Europe, and
to establish comparability with the results presented in
other papers recently written on this subject.
4. We added an oil price shock (“peak oil”) at the start of
our simulation in 2010, such that marginal costs of
fossil fuels instantaneously increase in 2010 from 4.1€/
MJ by 50%. This adjustment causes a temporary break
in emissions and spurs non-carbon fuel use during the
first decade of the simulation period.
5. We added decreasing-returns-to-scale for the non-fossil
fuel sector to reflect concerns over e.g. land availability
and resource optimality, such that its marginal costs
double when output increases from 0 to 320 EJ/year
(i.e. total energy demand in 1997).
6. As a result of the latter, non-fossil fuel learning-by-
doing is complemented by an opposing force, such that
marginal costs of non-fossil fuels decrease less compared
to previous model versions.
3 Simulations and Interpretations
3.1 Leakage Versus Discount Rate
While in earlier work based on DEMETER, we calculated
cost-effective strategies for a range of different climate
control targets, with the adjusted version of this model as
described above, we here carry out a full cost–benefit
analysis using either a high or low discount rate. Our basic
assumption is that this pure rate of time preference reflects
social preferences for long-term welfare, while capital
markets may have a higher rate of return. We thus assume
that capital markets are driven by forces not directly related
to long-term social preferences and are not in direct control
of governments. Note that Lind [20] discusses these matters
extensively and particularly assesses the impossibility of
Hicks compensation, a central assumption underlying the
use of market prices for cost–benefit analysis in an
intergenerational context.7 For the present study, in addition
to a benchmark scenario (not described here), we define
four policy scenarios with assumptions that put increasingly
higher costs on climate change damages:
S1: high discounting (ρ=3%/year), low damages
(2% GDP for 3°C), low leakage (average
delay=500 years)
S2: high discounting (ρ=3%/year), high damages
(20% GDP for 3°C), low leakage (average
delay=500 years)
S3: low discounting (ρ=1%/year), high damages
(20% GDP for 3°C), low leakage (average
delay=500 years)
S4: low discounting (ρ=1%/year), high damages
(20% GDP for 3°C), high leakage (average
delay=100 years)
Scenario S1 represents more or less the optimistic
perspective and descriptive view expressed by many
mainstream economists such as reported in Nordhaus [23].
Scenario S2 reflects a more pessimistic view on climate
change damages, as suggested for instance by Stern [28],
but maintains the descriptive welfare perspective with high
discounting. Scenario S3, on the other hand, adds to the
pessimistic climate damage standpoint a prescriptive or
ethical perspective as defended, for example, in Stern [28]
and Heal [12]. The fourth scenario, S4, assumes low
discounting, high damages, and also relatively ineffective
CCS (that is, characterized by high leakage of CO2).
A comparison of the carbon tax and CO2 emission
reductions across scenarios S1, S2, S3 and S4 (see Figs. 1
and 2) shows that not only discounting matters but also
expected climate damage estimates play as much a role for
the design of optimal climate policy. Figures 1 and 2 point
out that scenario S1 achieves only modest emission
reductions with respect to the baseline and, hence, requires
7 We here do not go into detailed discussion of high versus low
discounting, but only report on the consequences of our discounting
choices. We refer to Schneider et al. [26], and Gerlagh and Liski [3]
for new recent perspectives on this subject—these do not connect the
discussion to risk and uncertainty, but to private versus public
preferences.
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only low carbon taxing even by the end of the century.
Scenario S2 implies much more drastic climate mitigation
efforts (and hence much higher carbon taxes), with
emissions reduced well below 1990 levels by 2050, because
of high damages as a result of global climate change. The
required carbon tax proves to remain below 100 €/tCO2 for
the first 50 years. We emphasize that in order to correctly
interpret such a number, it is important to understand that in
our model carbon taxes apply globally, and emission
reduction efforts are shared worldwide. Otherwise, if only
the currently industrialized part of the world reduces CO2
emissions, much higher carbon taxes would be required in
the participating countries in order to achieve similar global
emission abatement levels. With low values of the discounting
rate (as in scenarios S3 and S4), CO2 emission levels are cut
back sharply to almost zero by the end of the century.
Required carbon taxes exceed the 100 €/tCO2 level from
today onwards. The difference between low and high leakage
(S4 versus S3) is hard to discern in Figs. 1 and 2 but
becomes much more pronounced in Figs. 3 and 4.
Figures 3 and 4 show that (1) higher climate damages
necessitate more CCS deployment (S2 versus S1), (2) lower
discounting reduces the effectiveness of CCS (S3 versus
S2), and (3) a higher CO2 leakage rate substantially reduces
the effectiveness of CCS and thus induces lower CCS
diffusion (S4 versus S3). Figure 4 also shows that (4) the
effectiveness of CCS is substantially less during early
decades in comparison to later in the century. Clearly, the
results depicted in Figs. 3 and 4 do not support the idea that
CCS constitutes only an intermediate technology that has as
main function to smoothen the transition from fossil fuels
towards non-carbon energy sources: CCS has an ever
increasing role during at least the twenty-first century. Our
results confirm some of the main results we reported in van
der Zwaan and Gerlagh [34]. They can be understood
through an inspection of Eq. 1—for doing so, it is
important to realize that while the overall tax levels
increase from S1 to S4, the tax growth rates (g) decrease
in this order (as demonstrated in Fig. 1). When we assume
high discounting and low climate damages (as in S1),
carbon taxes remain low so that CCS will only gradually be
deployed while not becoming a widely diffused technology
before the second half of the century (see Fig. 3). Higher
climate damage assumptions (S2 versus S1) lead to a higher
tax level, and as CO2 emissions consequently drop, the
atmospheric CO2 concentration increases less quickly: the
marginal damage incurred to the economy (which is
increasing in the CO2 concentration) thus increases less.
Higher climate damage assumptions, however, lead to a
lower g and thus to a higher CCS effectiveness: this
explains why the S2 line in Fig. 4 lies above the one for S1.
This observation also explains the pattern behind result (iv):
the shadow price (or carbon tax) of CO2 emissions
increases more strongly during the first decades than in
later ones, so that g decreases over time: hence, the CCS
Fig. 1 Optimal carbon tax in scenarios S1–S4
Fig. 2 Optimal emissions in scenarios S1–S4
Fig. 3 Optimal CCS diffusion in scenarios S1–S4
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effectiveness increases during the century. Lower discounting
increases the net present value of future leakages and thus
reduces the CCS effectiveness (see again Eq. 1). This explains
result (2), while (3) is obvious.
3.2 Uncertainty in Leakage and Damages
What could be the effect of uncertainty in our knowledge
about the value of climate change damages and CO2 leakage
rates? These types of questions have been addressed in a
theoretical setting by e.g. Ulph and Ulph [30] and Webster
[36], in applied integrated assessment models by Manne and
Richels [21], Nordhaus and Popp [22], Yohe et al. [38], and
Bosetti et al. [1], and in a simple cost–benefit analysis by
Rabl and van der Zwaan [25]. We define a new set of
scenarios with different possible values for the uncertain
parameters we want to study. We assume for all these
scenarios a low (and unique) value for the pure rate of time
preference (ρ=1%/year), since we find this value ethically
best defendable. Hence, our uncertainty analysis only
concerns scientific parameters and does not involve norma-
tive parameters such as the discount rate for welfare analysis.
We replace the previously assumed scenarios S1 and S2 with
scenarios SA and SB as defined below, while keeping S3 and
S4. Scenarios SA and SB differ from S3 and S4 only with
respect to the level of the global climate damages assumed.
We then have four possible climate change scenarios, SA,
SB, S3, S4: two based on low climate damage estimates and
two others on high damage estimates and, similarly, two
based on a high CO2 leakage rate and two others on a low
leakage rate. A fifth case, the policy scenario SH, introduces
uncertainty. This scenario generates hedging behavior, as we
assume that climate change damages and CO2 leakage
phenomena remain uncertain until 2050. After 2050, this
uncertainty resolves. The probabilities for low and high
climate damages are assumed equal, while a low leakage rate
is assumed four times more likely than a high speed of
seepage. Hence, in scenario SH the respective overall
realization probabilities for scenarios SA, SB, S3, and S4
are 40%, 10%, 40%, and 10%, respectively.
SA: Low damages (2% GDP for 3 K), low leakage
(average delay=500 years)
SB: Low damages (2% GDP for 3 K), high leakage
(average delay=100 years)
S3: High damages (20% GDP for 3 K), low leakage
(average delay=500 years)
S4: High damages (20% GDP for 3 K), high leakage
(average delay=100 years)
SH: Uncertainty with regard to damages and leakage until
2050, when uncertainty resolves
As one can see from Figs. 5 and 6, uncertainty regarding
climate change damages is (as expected) important for both
the shadow price and level of CO2 emissions. Under
uncertainty, the optimal carbon tax takes about the
(weighted) average level of that in the four potential
scenarios, i.e. around 100 €/tCO2 up to 2050. When climate
change damages turn out to be not too large, the CO2 price
can be lowered after 2050, while it needs a substantial
ramping up after 2050 if the more pessimistic estimates of
climate change damages turn out to be correct. It proves
that with high climate damages and high CO2 leakage the
optimal taxation level in 2100 is close to 900 €/tCO2, while
it reaches a value slightly exceeding 800 €/tCO2 in the high
climate damages with low seepage case. This finding
confirms our observations in the previous subsection. With
a high seepage rate, CCS can contribute less to overall
emission reductions; thus, more non-fossil fuel energy
needs to be employed, for which higher taxes are required.
Hence, total abatement costs (expressed as consumption
foregone) are also higher. Indeed, carbon taxes incur higher
immediate social costs in the high seepage scenario. In the
long term, however, the more intensive use of CCS in the
low seepage scenario proves to lead to a higher temperature
in the second half of the millennium.
Figures 6 shows the optimal level of CO2 emissions in
scenario SH. A first important observation is that even a
moderate carbon tax (of around 100 €/tCO2), when applied
consistently and globally until at least 2050, is capable of
significantly reducing the global level of CO2 emissions
Fig. 5 Optimal carbon tax in scenario SH
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until in any case the middle of the century. Clearly and
unsurprisingly, with higher carbon taxation, the emission
profile shown in Fig. 6 would become even lower. One also
clearly sees the model’s vintage structure, in the sense that
emissions are continuous (Fig. 6) even though policy
instruments switch in an abrupt fashion (Fig. 5). In the
SH sub-scenarios in which low climate damages are
revealed in 2050, carbon taxes are suddenly cut by about
a factor 4. Consequently, fossil fuels become abruptly very
competitive again, which explains the surge in CO2
emissions depicted in Fig. 6. Large new energy investments
will go into fossil fuel based technologies, not comple-
mented with CCS, which leads to a massive return in CO2
emissions, which by the end of the century exceed current
levels. That surge is comparable to the increase in use of
carbon-free energy sources during the first half of the
century. Also well visible from Fig. 6 is that when CCS
proves characterized by high CO2 leakage in 2050, the
deployed CCS activity to date will generate higher CO2
emissions. If in 2050, high climate damages are revealed,
then abatement of CO2 emissions needs to be further
enhanced, for which tax levels are required that are
eventually several times higher than those calculated
optimal for 2050.
Figures 7 and 8 show the atmospheric concentration of
CO2 and the global average temperature path, respectively,
during the entire millennium for each of the four scenarios
SA, SB, S3, and S4. As can be seen, in the low climate
damage scenarios (SA and SB), optimal calculated CO2
emission levels allow the atmospheric CO2 concentration to
rise above 1,000 ppmv, while the high damage cases (S3
and S4) keep the atmospheric CO2 concentration well
below 550 ppmv. From the CO2 emissions profile shown in
Fig. 6, we saw that the hedging scenario SH is strongly
skewed towards precautionary high abatement levels, that
is, the emission levels are well below the weighted average
of the four individual policy scenarios. Indeed, as can be
observed, in 2050, there is hardly any break in the
emissions (reduction) trend line if high climate damages
prove to be revealed in that year. The reason for this
outcome is that CO2 emission reductions become progres-
sively very hard to realize, in such a way that they are less
than proportional to carbon prices. In other words, during
the forthcoming several decades, the average CO2 price
(evolution) of the low damage and high damage scenarios
implies that emission cuts are close to the optimal levels of
the latter. Precaution is applied that accounts for the worst
possible outcome in 2050: if a steep emission reduction
path was not followed until the middle of the century, it
would become exceedingly costly—or even infeasible—
after 2050 to reach the few tCO2 emission level required in
scenarios S3 and S4 by the end of the century. Similar
precautionary results were obtained by Keppo and van der
Zwaan [15].
Figures 7 and 8 also show another remarkable feature:
low leakage rates do not prevent stored CO2 from leaking
back but merely delay the process. The consequence is
that with low leakage rates, the atmospheric CO2
concentration is lower during the first few centuries, but
when stored CO2 starts to seep, the atmospheric CO2
concentration eventually reaches a peak nearly as high as
in the high leakage case. Figure 7 shows that this delayed
peaking occurs close after the middle of the millennium.
As can be seen from Fig. 8, in the low leakage case the
global average surface temperature even increases beyond
a level seen in the high leakage scenario. The employment
of CCS may thus imply dangerous interference with the
climate system to be delayed by a century, or a couple of
hundreds of years. Note that the height of each of the
peaks in Fig. 7 (scenarios SA and SB) is to a large extent
due to the sheer volume of CCS activity deployed over the
first couple of centuries. The decline in CO2 concen-
trations after these respective peaks can be explained by
the fact that natural phenomena exist (such as ocean
uptake) that remove CO2 from the atmosphere, in
combination with the fact that fossil fuels (also when
equipped with CCS) are no longer used given the
competitiveness of renewables. Even though we apply a
low discount rate of 1%/year—which in principle should
position us to attach importance to distant concerns—counted
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over a millennium this amounts to a discount factor as
reductive as about 1:20,000. This points to a fundamental
problem with discounting: when current activities cause
damages in the very long term (say, as in our case, over some
thousand years), then any discounting seems inappropriate if
future consequences are considered relevant. We leave this
issue for further research, but here preliminarily argue that this
finding supports the reasoning of Stern [28] and Heal [12] in
support of (almost) zero discounting.
In different scenarios, CCS delivers varying contribu-
tions to achieve overall CO2 emission reductions. In the
short term, i.e. during the forthcoming few decades, CCS
activity proves driven by high carbon taxation and low CO2
leakage, as is shown by the graphs depicted in Fig. 9.
Indeed, the SH scenario graph is perfectly on course to
meet the high damage, low leakage scenario S3—the latter
is essentially the extrapolation of the former. In the longer
term, as it becomes more sensitive for DEMETER that CCS
does not constitute an entirely carbon-free technology and
that its deployment in the low leakage case involves only a
delay of CO2 emissions, not a pure emission reduction
strategy, CCS in relative terms turns not so favorable
anymore. This is especially true when climate-induced
damages to the global economy are revealed to be high. In
other words, CCS is not a sustainable activity when the
stored CO2 leaks to the atmosphere, even if this happens in
the distant future. The corresponding additional source of
CO2 emissions causes damages in the far future, which are
internalized in the decision making process of this century.
It can be observed that the low leakage case dominates the
policy in the stochastic scenario. The fact that a 20%
probability exists that high CO2 leakage materializes from
2050 onwards does not reduce the extent of CCS activity
until 2050 very much. After 2050 the four state-of-the-
worlds yield diverging CCS diffusion paths that are
compatible with the same logics as applicable to the
explanation of the dynamics behind Figs. 7 and 8.
The effectiveness of CCS—the measure for the efficiency
of CCS as introduced in the previous section—expresses
the share of CO2 emission permits or carbon taxes that
can be waived for CO2 stored underground through CCS
application. In Fig. 10, we see that, when climate change
damages and possible CO2 leakage phenomena remain for
the moment incompletely characterized quantities, the
CCS effectiveness until the middle of the century amounts
to about 50% today and increases to some 70% by 2050.
Hence, CCS should not be given full exemption from
payments for CO2 emission permits or, alternatively, from
carbon taxation, but be subject to about half of the CO2
price today and about a third in 2050. Figure 10 shows
also that when a high CO2 leakage rate is revealed in
2050, the CCS effectiveness dramatically drops to 20–
30%, at which level, it stays until the end of the century.
With a low leakage rate, on the other hand, the CCS
effectiveness further increases, to reach a value close to
90% in 2100. In each of these two leakage cases, it proves
that the intensity of the damages incurred as a result of
global climate change have little effect on the effective-
ness of CCS. Figure 10 demonstrates that the CCS
effectiveness never reaches its potential maximum of
100%. These findings imply that energy producers relying
on CCS-complemented fossil fuel combustion will have to
pay, in all four policy scenarios, some carbon taxes on the
mere basis of the fact that the CO2 they stored under-
ground involves a certain level of leakage. Whereas they
would not be fully penalized by the prevailing CO2 price,
their actions will definitely be influenced by CO2 price
variations: when carbon taxes go up, the competitiveness
of CCS with respect to non-carbon sources such as solar
and wind energy depreciates.
4 Conclusions
The findings reported in this article confirm many of the
conclusions made in our earlier work on the economics of
CCS and leakage of CO2 [34]. In that publication, we
derived an expression for the effectiveness of CCS, which
we employed again here. The simulated time paths for the
CCS effectiveness presented in the present paper showFig. 9 Optimal CCS diffusion in scenario SH
Fig. 10 CCS effectiveness in scenario SH
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more or less the same overall tendency as the ones
calculated for our prior article. It is also clear, however,
that some marked differences can be observed in the
numerical values of the evolution of our CCS effectiveness
expression between these two articles. This discrepancy can
largely be ascribed to two important modifications that we
introduced in DEMETER: (1) the introduction of uncer-
tainty in knowledge regarding two essential determinants of
energy policy, related to respectively climate damages and
CO2 leakage, and (2) the simulation of a much longer time
frame over which we analyze the economics of optimal
climate policy design, CCS implementation and its poten-
tially harmful feature in the form of CO2 seepage from
geological storage formations.
Among our more specific main results described in the
present study are, first, that CO2 leakage does eventually
(by the end of the century) not reduce the effectiveness of
CCS very much when one assumes a descriptive (high)
value for the discount rate, especially in combination with
high climate change damage assumptions. We demonstrated
that in the latter case with a 3%/year pure rate of time
preference, CO2 leakage with an average delay of 500 years
proves to be acceptable in our modeling framework, since
the CCS effectiveness amounts to about 70% today and
increases to over 95% by the end of the twenty-first century.
While the results reported in this paper cannot be directly
compared with those published in van der Zwaan and
Gerlagh [34]—where we showed that a leakage rate as
high as 1%/year could be acceptable—our descriptive
discounting findings are pretty much in agreement with
our prior ones. With a prescriptive (low) value for the
discount rate, however, leakage can become problematic:
leakage with a mean residence time of 100 years reduces
the attractiveness of CCS substantially, down to close to
0% today and at most only just above 20% during the
current century. With this finding, we clearly depart from
the more preliminary recommendations formulated in our
earlier article. In order to correctly draw our new conclusion, it
is imperative that calculations account for the very long term,
that is, as far in the future as the entire present millennium.
Almost all previous studies have so far failed to do so,
including our own simulations with DEMETER.We here also
found that even if affected by a long average leakage delay
(hence, a low leakage rate), CCS is capable of generating
climate change in the very long term. Furthermore, even a
pure discount rate as low as 1%/year may give an exceedingly
low weight to very long-term consequences of current
decisions. We thus believe that an important topic for future
work is a rigorous study of the main arguments in a
fundamental discussion about discounting in the very long
run versus cost–benefit analysis of global climate change.
Another major outcome of our present analysis is that
uncertainty regarding the value of the leakage rate and the
extent of climate-induced damages to the global economy
should not prevent us from deploying CCS on a large scale
(e.g., [14]). The deployment of CCS technology, however,
ought not to be fully exempt from carbon taxes. Or, in an
alternative policy scenario, emission permits should be
bought by electricity producers in order for them to be
allowed to run fossil-based power plants equipped with
imperfect (leakage-affected) CCS. With the arguments
made in this article, we do not necessarily provide
support for obliging, e.g., coal-based power plants to be
only operated if equipped with CCS technology. Rather,
we show that if an effective global climate treaty can be
agreed upon, the ensuing carbon price will stimulate the
use of coal with CCS and disfavor its use without CCS.
Furthermore, market forces will determine the extent to
which fossil fuel usage complemented with CCS tech-
nology will compete with non-carbon alternatives such as
renewables and nuclear energy. Possible CO2 leakage
phenomena can affect this competitiveness.
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